INTRODUCTION
Discussions over the law and regulation of Artificial Intelligence ("AI") and robots are all the rage as early applications are introduced in society. In computer science, concerns that "overly rigid regulations might stifle innovation", 1 have fueled proposals to create regimes of selective immunity for research on intelligent machines. 2 At the same time, ethical arguments have prompted calls for an all-out ban on research in relation to lethal automated weapons ("LAWs"). 3 And some writers claim that robots will become so important to mankind that "a new branch of the law" is needed, "to grant their race and its individual members the benefits of legal protection", much like the international community did, or tried to, with the environment. 4 Within the legal profession, the discussion focuses less on public policy issues. In each specialist field of the law, experts discuss whether AIs and robots call for changes to the rules that govern their discipline. 5 Take copyright law. A typical discussion is whether the rise of robots-created works necessitates to modify the statutes that grant protection to "the author", which is manifestly inapplicable for robots. 6 More generally, this approach can be seen in the  Professor of Law, University of Liege (ULg) ; Research Professor, University of South Australia (UniSA) ;
Working paper, comments welcome 09 March 2017 4 inappropriate to impute liability on humans for acts of autonomous robots, but at the same time calls for compulsory insurance on users. This is why this paper seeks to articulate an alternative methodology for the law and regulation of AIs and robots in a context of technological emergence. 17 The perspective taken is that of a benevolent social planner. The issue in discussion consists in localizing the regulation needs generated by the introduction of AIs and robots in society. By regulation, I
mean "State intervention into the economy by making and applying legal rules".
18
To be even more concrete, this paper attempts to address the following normative question:
should a benevolent social planner adopt specific rules and institutions for AIs and robots or instead, should the resolution of issues can be left to Hume's three "fundamental laws of nature", 19 namely ordinary rules on property and liability, 20 contract laws and the courts system. 21 I call this the basic legal structure. To explore that question, this paper applies a public interest framework. I choose this approach not because of an ideological belief that the public interest is the best guide of the regulatory hand. Instead, my choice is governed by logic. Public interest regulation is accepted by both consequentialists and liberal paternalists as one of the least intrusive regulatory methodologies. It is therefore the first next step if one starts from the assumption of a world governed by Hume's laws of nature. 17 In May 2016, the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament has issued a Draft Report with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015 /2103 ). This report invites other bodies to evaluate the implications of radical proposals, such as creating a specific legal status for robots or compulsory insurance schemes for producers or owners of robots. by consent, and of the performance of promises").
20 I do not discuss whether existing regulatory schemes that go beyond the basic legal structure are appropriate for AIs, for this is a largely empirical question. However, as Bertolini observes, law already exists -for instance existing product liability schemes -that can be readily applied to robotics. A. Bertolini, "Robots as products: the case for a realistic analysis of robotic applications and liability rules." Law, Innovation and Technology 5.2 (2013): 214-247. 21 Whilst our approach certainly cuts through the existence of many existing rules that can potentially apply to AI beyond the basic legal structure (for instance, product liability), our focus on the basic legal structure as the fallback system avoids the pitfall of assuming that a "disembodied free market" could solve all issues. On this, This paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, it reviews several regulation approaches proposed in the literature (I). In section 2, it discusses the regulatory trade-offs, namely the threats and opportunities created by the introduction of regulation in a context of technological evolution (II). In Section 3, it looks at the specific area of liability to discuss some law and regulation options (III). In section 4, it proposes a possible methodology for the law and regulation of AIs and robots (IV).
Before moving to the analysis of those issues, two last remarks are in order. First, I discuss both AIs and robots under the same intellectual roof, even though I am aware of the differences between those two technological fields. I do this not only because I conjecture a degree of convergence between both technologies, but primarily because intelligent machines in soft or hard envelopes have the ability to "act upon the world".
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Second, some may consider that this paper's subject of inquiry falls beyond the scope of legal
scholarship. Yet, the idea that a lawyer shall not discuss normative issues rests on a mistaken perspective on the legal system (that I have fought time and time again). The lawyer occupies a decentralized place in society. His work is by essence empirical. At bottom, the lawyer argues, assesses and comments "cases". This position makes him a firsthand witness of social, economic, moral and technological facts, and a useful adviser to the social planner. Under a legalistic approach, the social planner attempts to visualize how existing laws apply to an AI or a robotic application. 24 In other words, the question is therefore whether AI and robotic application is caught by existing legal rules. And the gist of the discussion is about frictional rule-implementation cases. The analysis is either conducted vertically within a specific field of the law by specialist lawyers, or horizontally across several fields of the law by generalist lawyers. In both cases, the assessment is conducted on a disciplinary basis. The disciplines commonly looked at in the scholarship are: product safety (including cyber security) and liability, consumer protection, intellectual property, labour law, privacy, civil liability, criminal liability, legal personhood, insurance and tax law.
To focus on a specific example, let us look at IP. A recurring discussion is whether AI-created inventions can be protected under IP laws (and if this is the case, who is their owner ) 25 .
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Consider an AI-created song. In the area of copyright law, there is a requirement of "originality". Across the globe, courts insist that the work exhibits a "modicum of creativity", reflects the "author's intellectual creation" or constitutes the exercise of "non-mechanical, non-trivial skill and judgment". 27 A debate today exists on whether the originality requirement prevents the allocation of copyrights to intelligent machines. And a proxy is that a selfie taken by a monkey has been deemed unsusceptible of copyright protection.
28 24 This can be understood with a little green men metaphor. An alien from a distant planet sets foot on Earth.
Most of Earth's clothing factories produce ready-to-wear suits for humans in calibrated sizes. Are human suits fitting, must they be stretched, adjusted, refitted? Or shall humans leave the alien naked?
25 By AI-created invention, I mean an invention fully brought to existence by the AI, without human assistance. Similarly, in the area of patent law, an innovation is protected on condition that it involves an "inventive" step. As a rule, inventiveness means non-obvious to a person skilled in the art. In layman's term, a non-obvious discovery is one that is unexpected. But where to set the benchmarks for "non-obviousness" and "skill in the art", when one contemplates the introduction of AIs capable of "recursive self-improvement". 29 What is not obvious to a man skilled in the art may be trivially evident for a super intelligent machine.
Whilst it is not my intention here to dwell on those specific issues, I want to stress that the legalistic approach has advantages and disadvantages. Its upside is to trigger a process of prospective and retrospective discussion of the social choices embedded in legal arrangements (hardly ever a bad thing The technological approach seems again more technology-optimistic than the legalistic approach. With this, the discussion often revolves around whether and how law and regulation risks stifling innovation incentives, research and development investments and inventive activity. 35 For instance, the Stanford Report stresses that AI is very relevant in relation to "regulation" without though discarding its relevance for other sources of law like common law, federal law, local statutes or ordinances. 36 As explained above, this refers to the ex ante coding of legal rules in AIs and robots at the design stage. will be used in conjunction with exoskeletons and virtual reality devices. A more distant projection is one in which one's digital driver is also one's digital butler and partner.
C. COMPARISON
The issue of whether AIs and robotic applications deserve to be granted legal rights -for instance, to litigate, contract or own property -and/or duties helps picture the differences between the legalistic and technological approach. 40 Under the former approach, the social planner would start from rules that confer legal personhood on humans, corporations, international organisations and innate objects like trees, 41 and attempt to understand if similar legal status can be extended to AIs and robots. Under the latter approach, the social planner looks at the technology, and applies a Turing test to establish whether legal personhood can be granted. This approach was the one followed by Lawrence Solum when he considered the following thought experiment: "Could an artificial intelligence serve as a trustee?".
42
The implications of both approaches are clear. The legalistic approach is driven by teleological questions: courts and legislature are asked to consider the goals pursued by legal personhood law. 43 For instance, legal personhood was granted to corporations in order to promote economic exchange. A question that will therefore arise will be: shall we give AIs and robots legal personhood to promote economic exchange, as was done for corporations?
39 See, for instance, http://www.rossintelligence.com/.
40 S. Chopra and L. F. White, A legal theory for autonomous artificial agents. University of Michigan Press, 2011 at 155 (conferring legal personhood necessitates a "decision to grant an entity a bundle of rights and concomitant obligations"). 43 See Chopra & White, supra at 186 ("the decision to accord or refuse legal personality (both dependent and, in function of increasing competence, independent) would ultimately be a result-oriented one for courts and legislatures alike, and cannot rest solely on conceptual claims").
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Similarly, a certain degree of legal personhood has been recognized to trees on grounds of sustainable development. In turn, the social planner could ponder whether AI legal personhood is likely to contribute to the conservation of global resources.
In contrast, the technology approach is more ontological. The inquiry consists in an assessment of what the technology is, and in particular of whether the technology displays human features. 44 The discussion thus mostly consists in a reflection on our own selves, and what makes us human. 45 With this, the technology approach may be skewed towards anthropomorphic AI and robotic applications ("hard" robots like Asimo) or representations (softbots like Siri, Alexa or Cortana), when it discusses the pros and cons of conferring of legal personhood to AIs.
C. SUMMATION
The legalistic and technology approaches are not exclusive and can certainly be combined. I represent them here as polar cases to ease understanding of the main methodological options available to a social planner.
Often, however, regulators seem to follow both. This can be seen in the European Parliament 2017 resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics. 46 Even though the methodology followed remains unknown, the rich inventory of measures proposed in relation to AIs and robotics seems underpinned by both sets of perspectives.
II. REGULATORY TRADE-OFFS
Law and regulation in a context of technological emergence involves complex trade-offs. I discuss each of them first from a theoretical perspective, and follow with an application to AIs and robots. 44 Here, we fall in a complex philosophical discussion, as to whether our criteria of choice is Wittgenstein Closer to us, Renda and Pelkmans take the example of Genetically Modified Organs ("GMOs"). 48 In the EU, a strict authorization regime was set. As a result, only two new GMO products have to date been allowed to be cultivated, despite reported benefits to farmers and a possible reduction in poverty and hunger.
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Even closer to digital innovations, the regulation of bitcoin payments and blockchain platforms, including caps on usage and transparency requirements may actually run amok with the very purpose of anonymity sought by users of the system.
With this background, let us try to consider possible examples of AI-disabling regulations.
Some of them are already in discussion. Restrictions on the ability or conditions for the operation of unmanned aerial systems and drones to fly beyond visual line of sight ("BVLOS") could stifle the development of delivery and transport applications. Similarly, requirements to allocate a given amount of money to a robotic application could prohibitively inflate the cost of production and consumption of AI applications, and raise a barrier to their penetration in society.
An interesting observation to be made is that regulation can be consciously or even deliberately disabling. To put the point differently, regulation is not only inadvertently or accidentally disabling. GMOs are a case in point. One of the rationales for their strict regulation is that the scientific community suspects a safety threat 14 The potential for knee jerk regulation of AIs and robotics is easy to foresee. Take a deficient AI airliner autopilot. And let one assume that society displays a lower tolerance threshold for accidents caused by machines. In this context, it can be anticipated that society will respond to any crash with a prohibition of fully or partly AI-operated planes, and roll back to require a significant degree of human operation. This is in spite of existing evidence that human operated flights may be significantly less secure than MI-assisted ones, and that the source of the problem often lies in the complex interaction between automated machines and humans.
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With this, instead of prohibiting, regulation should seek to improve machine-human cooperation in ways that enhance safety.
C. RENT-SEEKING AND REGULATORY CAPTURE
The rent seeking hypothesis explains that private interest groups have incentives and ability to steer government regulatory action towards their own benefit. Rent seeking is effective when the private interest group is a large organization, for the benefits of regulation will exclusively accrue to it. In contrast, when private interests are fragmented, rent seeking is less likely because the costs of coordination are high, and the benefits of regulation must be shared.
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Frederic Bastiat, a XIXth century intellectual, described rent seeking with a powerful allegory. 59 In a "Petition from candle makers", the French lightning industry was seeking protection from the ruinous competition of the sun… The candle makers had accordingly petitioned the Chamber of Deputies to "pass a law requiring the closing of all windows, dormers, skylights, inside and outside shutters, curtains, casements, bull's-eyes, deadlights, and blinds-in short, all openings, holes, chinks, and fissures through which the light of the sun is wont to enter houses, to the detriment of the fair industries with which, we are proud to In so far as AIs and robots are concerned, rent seeking concerns seem more acute under the technological than the legalistic approach. In general, the technological approach seems more skewed in favour of technological development, in contrast with the legalistic approach which seems more technology neutral. Hence, the technological approach may be more exposed to rent seeking by stakeholders from the technology community.
Concretely, one area with rent seeking potential is car insurance. In many countries, the law imposes insurance duties on driver and/or user. With self-driving cars, the case for driver and/or user compulsory insurance is less compelling. There is less driver control, fewer accidents and lower damages at society level. 62 Of course, trees and snow still fall, causing casualties on the road. However, as autonomy progresses, allocating liability on driver and/or user seems less justified, and a transfer to driverless cars manufacturers is a more plausible 64 See https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eu-considers-new-insurance-laws-for-driverless-cars/.
65 By the same token, car manufacturers may lobby government so as to be insulated from all liability, and deflect it towards software developers.
66 Consider a proposed Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulation that insists that unmanned aircraft system ("UAS") must be limited "to daylight-only operations, confined areas of operation, and visual-line-ofsight operations". Now compare this with surveys reporting that pilots spend just seven minutes manually operating their planes in a typical flight. 
III. LIABILITY
It is now time to take a practical look at the challenges faced by a social planner in a context of AI and robotic emergence. To keep the discussion concrete, I have chosen to discuss the question of liability, which is the legal issue that garners the highest interest from scholars and practitioners. 77 In short, the question of liability consists in asking: who pays for harm caused by AIs? In this section, I tackle this simple interrogation first by considering the main regulatory options faced by a benevolent social planner operating under the basic legal structure (A). I then discuss first order (B) and second order problems (C).
A. BASIC LEGAL STRUCTURE
In both civil and common law systems, the law imputes liability for harm upon a variety of legal agents. Put simply, victims can seek damages against several targets. Pelkmans, and A. Renda, supra. The optimistic tone of the literature on enabling regulation shall however not obscure that firms may follow innovation strategies designed to evade the law. The 2015 Volkwagen NOx (nitrogen oxides) emission scandal highlights that when overly ambitious regulatory targets are adopted, firms have incentives to invest into technologies which game the enforcement system, including malicious software.
76 R. Calo, 2011, supra . 77 This is true both under the legalistic and technological approaches. system has yet undertaken.
Second, a victim can seek to engage the vicarious liability of a third party with oversight. For simplicity, I call this third party a "governor". Common examples include the vicarious liability of employers, parents, masters and owners, for damage caused respectively by employees, children, slaves and property. In so far as AIs are concerned, the governor of an algorithmic machine could be held liable for damages. In both civil and common law, vicarious liability regimes are negligence or fault-based. They necessitate a degree of wrongdoing. For instance, in Belgian civil law, when the agent of harm is a thing, the damage claimant must establish a "defect" understood as an abnormal feature that may be conducive to damage in certain circumstances. 79 In contrast, in French civil law, there is no necessity to establish a defect. Both regimes, however, require proof that the keeper of the thing exercised effective control over it.
Third, victims can target damages claims against the manufacturer. In most countries, defective products laws repute manufacturers liable for damage caused by the products they bring to markets. 80 A product is generally deemed defective when it generates unexpected injury in normal use. 81 In turn, a defect is assessed in standard circumstances of use that is "use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put". Most defective products laws establish a strict liability regime: the mere proof of a defect triggers liability, 80 See, in the EU, Directive 85/374/EEC on liability for defective products. 81 EU law says that a defect means that the product "does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect". The basic legal structure thus essentially offers victims two potential and non-alternative routes for the recovery of damages caused by AIs and robots. Victims may seek to impute liability to the governor of the application and/or to its manufacturer. Having come to that initial diagnosis, a social planner may reach the preliminary conclusion that AI and robotic liability is not a legal desert. The next exercise that it would then face is one of problem identification. This is the set of issues that I now examine, distinguishing between first and second order problems.
B. FIRST ORDER PROBLEMS
First order problems are those that arise when legal rules and standards fail to fulfil their goals. In other words, first order problems are teleological.
Generally, liability law can be deemed to serve two functions: a corrective function, namely remove past harm by providing a solvent target to victims; an incentive function, namely deter the future occurrence of damage, by confiscating the gains of harmful conduct. 84 Against this background, the basic legal structure generates three types of first order problems when applied to AIs and robots.
The first problem is one of under-correction of harm. Assume that open, generalist and modular AI applications (hereafter, "open AIs") are introduced in society, besides narrow AIs like self-driving cars, delivery drones or intelligent vacuum cleaners. Open AIs lack a set function. Like Swiss army knives, they can be used for many purposes, in many contexts, and in combination with many other tools. They therefore cannot be deemed to operate abnormally or unexpectedly, as requested to trigger liability under torts, civil law of defective products legislation. In such circumstances, victims will fail to collect compensation, and one goal of the liability system is put into jeopardy. 82 Id. "liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production".
83 In EU law, the manufacturer can argue in defense that it did not put the product into circulation, that the defect has been caused by mandatory compliance with rule of law, or that scientific or technical state of the art was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. Relatedly another under-correction problem could occur with fully autonomous AIs that do not implicate a human "in" or "on" the loop. In such circumstances, damage claimants will face a daunting task to establish a situation of governance under vicarious liability. By definition, a fully autonomous AI or robot is one that evades human control. Here, one can see instantly that such problems do not necessarily require clarification, modification or introduction of new liability laws. Instead, safety standards and product design requirements are a possible avenue. For instance, such statutes could require all fully autonomous AIs and robots to be equipped with fail-safe, red button shutdown systems.
The second problem is one of over-correction of harm. As a mirror hypothesis to the previous problem, courts may consider that the user of a generalist AI may reasonably expect safety in all circumstances, which risks being impossible to guarantee by robotic producers. This is
particularly true of open robotic platforms which invite third parties to tinker. As Calo puts it:
"the manufacturer could not necessarily anticipate the universe of potential problems that might stem from third party innovation and provide warnings or modify the platform design in response".
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The third problem is one of perverse incentives in a complex value chain. The Coase theorem helps understand this. 86 Pursuant to the Coase theorem, who is liable under the law -victim, governor or manufacturer -is to some extent irrelevant. As long as there are no transaction costs (and property rights are well defined), parties will bargain the efficient solution for society. This can be understood with the following fictional example: A is a crop grower who uses a robot gardener to irrigate its fields at night, when water and electricity costs less. B is an entrepreneur who buys a neighbouring piece of land, and launches a boutique hotel.
Because of A's robot's noise and lights at night, B's clients flee in droves and write incendiary reviews on websites.
Coase explains that the question of who should be liable in that situation is a moral issue that should not retain the interest of a social planner. This is because, as long as transactions costs are minimized, A and B will reach agreement over the cheapest solution regardless of the allocation of liability. Again, the example is useful. To eliminate the harm, two options are possible: A sends the robot for mechanical soundproof improvement, and this will cost €5,000; B installs double glazing, and this will cost €15,000. In our example, the socially 85 See R. Calo (2011) supra. 22 efficient solution -the one to which the lower amount of resources are devoted -is that the robot is sent for mechanical improvement. Coase shows that this solution will prevail, whatever the law says of the allocation of liability. If the law assigns a right to silence to B, then A will not wait to be sued, 87 and he will pay 5,000€ to retool its robot. Now if the law assigns a right to noise to A, then B will pay €5,000€ to A in exchange for a mechanical improvement of the robot. 88 In either case, the efficient solution prevails, regardless of who is liable. For the social planner, the specific allocation of liability is therefore irrelevant.
However, there is a significant caveat to this logic. Negotiation is not always frictionless. If there are transactions costs (which is often the case in the real world), parties will not be able to bargain efficient outcomes, and the social planner should allocate liability upon the cheapest cost avoider. Returning to the example, transactions costs would for instance be present if A was a cooperative of distinct crop growers. Being liable under the law, B would find bargaining for €5,000 with multiple parties costly. In turn, B would likely contemplate installing double glazing, which would lead to a €10,000 loss for society. In such circumstances, Coase said that the law should assign liability so as to emulate the cheapest cost solution that would have prevailed in negotiation. 89 In our example, A should be deemed liable.
If one applies this idea to AIs, the Coase theorem invites a social planner to consider whether (i) there will be transaction costs to negotiation; and (ii) if this is the case, to search for the cheapest cost solution, and more particularly, to look into the AI and robotic value chain for liability on the cheapest cost avoider. Whilst the first issue is largely an empirical matter, the second question is easier to conceptualize. A variety of economic agents other than those that the basic legal structure reputes liable -the governor and manufacturer -contribute upstream to the operation of AIs upon the world. This is the case of programmers (C), standard setting organizations (D), and perhaps the AI application itself (E). And those agents may be in a position to avoid the harm at lower cost. For instance, the cheapest solution in the example may consist in C writing a line of code that disables all noisy robot functionalities at night or for D to write a standard to the same effect.
87 For €15,000.
88 In reality, B will pay an amount comprised between 5,000€ and 15,000€.
89 One underpinning of this idea is that the negative externality inflicted by regulatory system should be as minimal (in efficiency terms) as possible. according to the rules on privacy, which can in turn be held liable to compensate any damage due to unlawful data processing. 91 Or say that A's robot gardener has shot sunset photographs during its operations. A displays the pictures on its website. B copies the pictures, and uses them to advertise its boutique hotel on reservation platforms. A sues B for copyright liability. B counter argues that A has no right to damages, because it is the robot gardener that is the "author" entitled to copyright protection.
In the absence of a clear, unequivocal and definitive resolution of first order issues by a central lawmaking authority -Supreme Court, deliberative assembly, executive agency -such questions are left to litigation. Courts will solve implementation problems on the basis of preferred principles of legal interpretation (eg ontological, deontological, consequential or teleological). Note here that second order problems may arise before first order problems.
The main problem generated by second order problems is one of legal uncertainty. Pending the resolution of goal-related issues by a central lawmaking authority, a degree of variance is inevitable in decentralized courts system. This may raise compliance costs. As seen above, a 90 All the more so if, on top of efficiency concerns, the social planner seeks to tackle morality issues. 91 In EU law, a processor can be defined as: "processor' means a natural or legal person, public authority, This claim, however, must be put into perspective with the benefits arising from the decentralized operation of the courts' system. One of them is the supply of empirical data to lawmakers, in areas rife with information asymmetries, and thus exposed to misguided regulatory intervention. 94 Another one is the production of scientific evidence, thanks to the examination and cross-examination of facts, law and witnesses under due process rules (meaning that arguments get a chance to be falsified). A last one is the generation (and experimentation) of alternative options for lawmakers.
Given its mixed effects, legal uncertainty does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient basis to warrant regulatory intervention. 95 In practice, this means that lawyers' concerns at the repetition of second order implementation problems ought not trigger immediate response. A period of experimentation in the courts system may be an appropriate alternative. All the more so if this creates time for the parallel deliberation of complex normative issues.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION AND NORMATIVE APPLICATIONS
92 Even free-market scholars consider that absent regulation, risk of case by case litigation can be worse. See R.A. Epstein, supra ("At bottom, the proper inquiry never poses the stark choice of regulation versus no regulation"); J.M. Balkin, supra ("The new technology disrupts the existing scene of regulation, leading various actors to scramble over how the technology will and should be used. As people scramble and contend with each other over the technology, they innovate-not only technologically, but also socially, economically, and legally-leading to new problems for law. Instead of saying that law is responding to essential features of new technology, it might be better to say that social struggles over the use of new technology are being inserted into existing features of law, disrupting expectations about how to categorize situations").
Economists also explain that unpredictable regulatory intervention is a source of uncertainty, which too can be detrimental to investments. 93 In substance, they request the central lawmaking authority to specify ex ante a precise legal rule -the robot is a processor if it meets condition X, Y and Z -or an abstract legal standard -the robot is a processor if it is autonomous.
94 They do this because legislators generally have limited information and expertise in specialist areas and, though knowing that there is a problem, tend not to know how to solve it. 95 In line with this, regulation theorists rarely mention legal uncertainty as a market failure worthy of Government remediation. This section attempts to provide some guidance on a possible method for the regulation of AIs and Robots. I introduce some key concepts first (A). I then delineate some preliminary normative implications (B).
A. CONCEPTS
To lay down my framework, I start from the conservative but not exhaustive proposition that law and regulation purport to address externalities. By externalities, I mean activities that inflict harm or provide benefits to third parties.
This proposition is rooted in mainstream public interest theory. The choice of this framework is not the result of convenience or coincidence, but instead follows the dominant paradigm in AI and robotics. 96 Sci-fi readers will recall that Asimov's first law of robotics ambitioned to prevent a robot to "injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm". Since then, much scholarship in "hard" and "soft" social sciences discusses
Asimov's laws as a starting point of inquiry. Rarely, in fact, has pop culture so much influenced academic research.
Two types of externalities can be distinguished. A negative externality occurs when an AI or robotic application imposes costs on third parties, and when the AI or robotic application (or its governor) do not internalize all or any of those adverse effects. A positive externality appears when an AI or robotic application provides benefits on third parties, and when the AI or robotic application (or its governor) fail to appropriate all or any of those effects.
Economic theory suggests that rational agents overinvest in the supply of activities that produce negative externalities. For example, competing manufacturers may race to introduce new generations of robots at rapid pace, in disregard of the costs incurred by users to decommission obsolete robots. Conversely, economic theory indicates that rational agents underinvest activities which yield positive externalities. For example, manufacturers may not invest in ethical standards and "friendly AI" initiatives for robotic applications, because the benefits of this are largely appropriated by third parties. In both configurations, economic theory explains that a public interest-driven social planner can attempt to correct externalities through the imposition of taxes, the allocation of subsidies or the promulgation of explicit legislative and administrative controls. 
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Building on this notion of externalities, I introduce hereafter a novel distinction between three groups of externalities. The first group consists in discrete externalities that is harm or benefits with the following non-cumulative properties: personal, random, rare or endurable.
By personal, I consider externalities that affect the unit level of the individual. Randomness means that the externality may affect all and any third party with equal chance. By rare, I
consider low frequency externalities. And by endurable, I talk of externalities that do not completely "ruin quality of life" or that do not radically improve it (non pure human enhancement).
98
A typical example of a negative discrete externality is a robot gardener whose visual recognition module dysfunctions, and confuses the neighbor's cat with a parasite, ending up spraying the cat with toxic pesticide. A typical example of a discrete positive externality occurs if the crop-grower is able to eradicate nocturnal parasites when the robot gardener is operated at night.
The second group covers systemic externalities. This refers to third party harm or benefit with the following non-cumulative properties: local, predictable, frequent or unsustainable. By local, I look at harm or benefit that affect a non trivial segment of the population. By predictable, I envision harm or benefit that is foreseeable for a benevolent social planner. By frequent, I mean a repeated occurrence of harm or benefit. By unsustainable, I refer to a nontransitory reduction or increase in well-being of the local population class under consideration (given scarce resources). A durable rise in inequalities (poor get poorer, rich get richer) is a case in point.
An often-discussed negative systemic externality consists in the substitution of man by intelligent machines on the factory floor (and the ensuing disappearance of many existing manufacturing jobs, pressure on workers' wages in the long term, etc.). Conversely, a less discussed, though equally important positive systemic externality consists in the new complementary jobs that will be created by the introduction of intelligent machines and cognitive computing in industrial sectors (and the corollary reduction in manufacturing costs across the economy as well as transfers of productivity gains to consumers through lower prices).
The third group of externalities comprises existential threats and opportunities created by AIs and robotic applications. To denote their existential nature, I call them as "existernalities". In this last section, I develop some normative implications of the above conceptual framework. This is done by taking the perspective of a public-interest minded social planner.
To start, the resolution of discrete externalities should be left to the basic legal infrastructure.
In practice, the social planner defers to the decentralized courts system which will process discrete externalities on a case-by-case basis. Disputes are solved ex post through the application of the general rules of property, contract and liability and other specific laws. This is acceptable because discrete externalities cannot affect society by any significant order of magnitude. Moreover, this regulatory approach is efficient, because it allows a degree of decisional experimentation, benchmarking, and cross-fertilization.
In contrast, the more severe threshold effects encountered with systemic externalities deserve a degree of ex ante consideration by the social planner. The question before it is whether ad hoc law or regulation ought to be adopted to correct the systemic externality. Here are some examples of such questions in relation to negative externalities: must a specific tax be
